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Miranda and the Media: Tracing the Cultural 
Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution 
Russell Dean Covey* 
INTRODUCTION 
Law’s interplay with popular culture is fascinatingly 
multifaceted, and nowhere has the complexity of the relationship 
played out more fully than with the media’s treatment of  
Miranda v. Arizona.1  Not only did television make the Miranda 
warnings famous,2 its adoption of Miranda as an icon of criminal 
procedure may be the main reason Miranda is good law today.  
At least, one can extract that claim from the Court’s decision in 
Dickerson v. United States.3 
The Dickerson Court declined the opportunity to overrule 
Miranda and return interrogation law to its pre-Miranda status, 
it said, largely because “Miranda has become embedded in 
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have 
become part of our national culture.”4  Pop culture thus saved 
Miranda.  But why?  What, if any, link is there between the 
procedures that constitute “routine police practice” and the fact 
that Miranda has become a part of the national culture? 
To the extent that there is a link at all, I suspect it is quite 
attenuated.  Delivery of Miranda warnings to a suspect prior to 
custodial interrogation is only one of many routine police 
practices, most of which—say, the search-incident-to-arrest 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., 
Princeton University; A.B., Amherst College.   
 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights In Historical Context: In Defense Of 
Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 998 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
(2004)) (noting that most Americans “can recite the Miranda warning from memory 
because they have heard it so often on television”). 
 3 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). The issue presented to the 
Court in Dickerson was the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a provision of the 1968 
Omnibus Crime Control Act which purported to replace Miranda with an approach to 
assessing the admissibility of statements obtained in custodial interrogation that directed 
courts to consider several factors, viewed in the “totality of the circumstances,” in 
assessing whether a statement was “voluntary” and thus admissible under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 431–32. 
 4 Id. at 443. 
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rules—never became national icons.  And what does 
embeddedness in pop culture have to do with the 
constitutionality of a warning requirement?  On the surface at 
least, not much.  In my view, the Dickerson Court’s claim is best 
read as stating not one but two distinct justifications for 
upholding Miranda.  One claim is that Miranda should be 
preserved because the Miranda warnings have become a useful 
part of routine police practice.5  A second is that the Miranda 
warnings should not be dispensed with because of the collateral 
damage that would result from uprooting such an embedded 
cultural icon. 
This article comments on the second of those two claims.  It 
explores the depiction of interrogation in film and television from 
the 1940s to the present, and contrasts that imagery with the 
Supreme Court’s interrogation jurisprudence over the same time 
frame.6  Although my treatment of the subject is necessarily only 
fragmentary (a comprehensive review of either topic would fill 
many volumes), this article hazards a few tentative hypotheses. 
First, a review of the treatment of interrogation in both 
domains during this period strongly suggests that law and 
popular culture are not autonomous regions of thought or distinct 
and isolated disciplines,7 but rather that law and culture are in 
deep dialogue.  On the one hand, as Professors Sarat and Kearns 
have noted, law is “constitutive of culture” in the sense that its 
“concepts and commands” have a way of penetrating the cultural 
 
 5 That the Miranda warnings have been widely accepted as useful to prosecutors 
and the police is indicated by the fact that the United States in Dickerson agreed with the 
defendant that the Miranda warnings should not be overturned.  The opposing position 
was argued by an amicus appointed by the Court.  See Timothy P. O’Neill, Why Miranda 
Does Not Prevent Confessions: Some Lessons from Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and Oprah 
Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863, 865 (2001) (noting that “the federal government in 
Dickerson was happy to accept Miranda.  Prosecutors have grown to like the fact that 
following Miranda’s formalistic rules almost invariably leads to admission of the 
confession.  Moreover, the vast majority of suspects do not choose to invoke Miranda’s 
protections anyway”). 
 6 As discussed below, part of the story concerns the triangular relationship 
<suspect—detective—law> whereby at different times the three have different 
relationships.  At the risk of gross overgeneralization, in the noir period, suspect and 
detective were relatively equally matched, and the law was primarily depicted as a 
brooding omnipresence.  During the Miranda era, the (good) law was infused with a more 
activist role as a shield for the (good) suspect against the (bad) police detective.  That 
picture was reversed in the post-Miranda period, paradigmatically illustrated in Dirty 
Harry, where the (good) police detective actively opposes the (bad) suspect and the (bad) 
law.  More recently, in cop shows like NYPD Blue and Homicide, the cycle has come full 
circle with a return to the depiction of “good/bad” cops squaring off against “good/bad” 
criminals under a “good/bad” law. 
 7 See PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW & 
LITERATURE 4 (2000) (noting that “[j]udges, lawyers, and legal scholars . . . have tended to 
treat the procedures and the language of the law as if they were fully hermetic”). 
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consciousness almost imperceptibly.8  At the same time, “[l]egal 
meanings are not invented and communicated in a unidirectional 
process.”9  Law’s “internal definitions of some of its terms of art” 
cannot be reliably understood without reference to popular 
meanings and ordinary language.10  Both popular culture and 
law draw from, and add to, a common set of iconographic images 
that represent and describe the world, thereby creating 
something of a collage of interrogation imagery that might be 
studied through a “semiotics” of law and order—that is, an 
attempt to construct meaning by analyzing the contexts and 
mutual relationships in which the concepts of law and order are 
embedded.11  Because of this dialogic relationship, not only can 
the history of law be illuminated by reference to pop culture (and 
vice versa), but the constraints and demands of form and 
convention that each genre imposes in its own respective sphere 
necessarily influence and transform its counterpart. 
Second, the history of Miranda’s iconization, duly noted by 
the Court in Dickerson, aptly illustrates this semiotics.  I thus 
attempt to show that the changing depiction of Miranda on film 
and television intersects revealingly with the successive Warren, 
Burger, and Rehnquist Courts’ treatment of interrogation law 
generally, and Miranda law in particular. 
The origins of the story, however, predate Miranda.  The 
“interrogation moment” has always been a central component of 
the popular image of law and order, from the single-minded effort 
of Porfiry Petrovich to secure Raskolnikov’s confession in 
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment,12 to the weekly episodes of 
NYPD Blue in which Detectives Bobby Simone and Andy 
Sipowicz play good cop/bad cop, using a variety of lawful and 
unlawful tactics in the “interview room” to induce suspects to 
confess guilt.13  Miranda’s story must be understood as a 
continuation of an older plotline concerning popular culture’s use 
of confession as a narrative device and its exploitation of police 
 
 8 See LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 7 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1998). 
 9 Id. at 8. 
 10 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 4.  See also LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra 
note 8, at 4–5. 
 11 For one take on the meaning of the phrase “legal semiotics,” see Jeremy Paul, The 
Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1787–88 (1991) (identifying a central 
tenet of semiology as providing that “signs [like words or legal arguments] take their 
meaning from their mutual relationships in a system of signification” (quoting J.M. 
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1121 
(1990))). 
 12 See William Burnham, The Legal Context and Contributions of Dostoevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2002). 
 13 Susan Bandes & Jack Beermann, Lawyering Up, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 5, at 7 (1998) 
(discussing interrogation tactics portrayed on NYPD Blue). 
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interrogation as the vehicle that brings about these confessions.  
Confession’s narrative convenience collides awkwardly with 
Miranda’s function as a legal solution to a problem dogging the 
Court at least since Brown v. Mississippi14: how to sort out the 
respective roles of police, trial courts, and appellate courts in 
setting the parameters of interrogation, in a way that ensures 
that confessions satisfy whatever qualitative criteria are 
necessary—be it reliability, voluntariness, or absence of torture 
or overt coercion—without overstepping their competency and 
jurisdictional bounds and without undermining effective law 
enforcement.  Both law and pop culture have struggled to 
reconcile these competing demands. 
Pop culture’s confessional needs are not dissimilar to law’s, 
but neither are they identical.  Like all effective dramatic 
narratives, crime dramas must tell their stories within the short 
time their formats permit.  Parsimony therefore is extremely 
important.  At the same time, effective dramatic narrative 
requires enough of a sense of verisimilitude to permit the viewer 
to suspend disbelief for the duration of the drama.15  The device 
of the confession serves the needs of parsimony well; it is the 
primary vehicle for narrative closure.  (As will be discussed later, 
it is with respect to verisimilitude that confession as a plot device 
creates problems.)  Few and far between are the crime and cop 
shows that do not end with the criminal’s confession.  The 
indispensability of the confession is evidenced by the fact that 
even in a contemporary crime show like CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation, which depicts the crime-solving activities of 
forensic crime investigators whose job is to analyze and piece 
together physical evidence left at crime scenes, virtually every 
episode concludes with an interrogation (a highly unrealistic bit 
of role confusion) and confession from the “real” criminal.16 
The screenwriter’s dramatic reliance on confessions, 
regardless of story structure, is intuitively understandable.  
Where the narrative is presented from the viewpoint of the 
investigating detective, police officer, or crusading citizen who 
must solve a crime, the criminal’s confession provides the 
possibility of a definitive resolution of the mystery; it permits 
revelation of what “really happened.”  At the same time, where 
 
 14 297 U.S. 278, 286–87 (1936). 
 15 See Norman Rosenberg, Looking for Law in All the Old Traces: The Movies of 
Classical Hollywood, the Law, and the Case(s) of Film Noir, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1448–
50 (2001) (discussing the requirements of realism and effective storytelling, including the 
need to reach adequate resolution of narrative tensions necessary to construct the plot). 
 16 The absurdity of lab technicians conducting interrogations is fairly self-evident.  
See Joanne Kimberlin, Forget What You See on ‘CSI,’ THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 3, 2006, 
at A1. 
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the narrative is presented from the criminal’s perspective, the 
confession permits the character development so essential to 
effective narrative; the criminal confesses to demonstrate his 
acknowledgement of transgression, to make vengeance for 
wrongdoing possible, to create the preconditions for remorse, or 
to lay the foundation for just retribution.  Dramatic convention 
requires that a villain give some verbal or at least inferable 
acknowledgement of culpability before the hero is permitted to 
plug him with lead.17  Avenging heroes do not kill transgressors 
unaware.  Not only would an unwarned killing be unmanly, it 
would defeat the very idea of retribution for which the avenging 
hero stands, because retributive punishment loses its meaning 
unless its subject is aware of the reasons for his punishment.18 
Confession is equally important where the suspect in a 
dramatic narrative is innocent.  Indeed, confession is perhaps 
even more important in this context, because a suspected 
character’s innocence cannot be dispositively confirmed absent an 
exonerating explanation.  As Peter Brooks writes, “[E]xculpation 
depends on articulation.”19  Resolution cannot occur unless the 
protagonist confesses the truth or the guilty party confesses to 
absolve the innocent.  Thus, regardless of whether the story’s 
protagonist is criminal or cop, guilty or innocent, narrative rules 
require a response to accusation in order to confirm guilt or to 
deny it, to justify retribution or defeat it. 
Pop culture could hardly live without confession.  Nor, as it 
turns out, can law.  Some of the most interesting contemporary 
jury research suggests that juries evaluate evidence through a 
narrative lens.20  That is, in reaching verdicts, “jurors impose a 
narrative story organization on trial information.”21  As such, the 
cognitive strategies jurors rely upon in the courtroom are similar, 
if not identical, to those at work in the living room or theater.  
Confessions likely perform a narrative function in the courtroom 
similar to that in fiction—they parsimoniously and definitively 
resolve doubts regarding the veracity of the prosecutor’s story.  
The legal system’s overwhelming reliance on guilty pleas to 
resolve criminal charges, moreover, further elevates the 
 
 17 PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 84 (2001) (explaining that 
retributive vengeance requires that before receiving his (or her) just deserts the 
wrongdoer “accept that what he (or she) did to someone else was wrong”). 
 18 See id.  The requirement that criminal defendants must be competent at the time 
they are executed has been held to be a fundamental attribute of due process.  Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). 
 19 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 114. 
 20 See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision 
Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 (Reid 
Hastie ed., 1993). 
 21 Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted). 
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importance of confession, since confession serves as a substitute 
for objective evidence of guilt.  Appellate courts have come to rely 
on confessions (in the form of guilty pleas) in order to minimize 
post-conviction process.  From the point of view of the legal 
system, confession (in the interrogation room or the courtroom) 
provides the closure necessary to the system’s function and 
legitimacy.  It thus comes as no surprise that the Court has 
announced that law cannot do without confession, proclaiming 
that “[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely ‘desirable,’ they 
are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, 
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”22    
But that still leaves the problem of how, consistent with the 
demands of verisimilitude and constitutional law, the confession 
is to be induced. After all, few confessions in reality are freely 
offered.23  Bound up with the drama of confession, then, is the 
distinctive role performed by the confessor’s handmaiden: the 
interrogator, who in drama as in real life may wear many hats,24 
including psychoanalyst, priest, lover, or policeman, or who may 
not be a person at all, but rather a diary25 or dictaphone.26   
As we will see, Miranda’s story reflects an evolving 
understanding of the relationship between police interrogator 
and suspect told by successive generations of jurists.  But the 
Supreme Court was far from the only arbiter of the interrogation 
room.  Even as the Supreme Court in its role as constitutional 
overseer of police evidence-gathering methods focused on the 
delicate legal intracacies of interrogation—weighing and 
balancing the respective importance of such values as individual 
autonomy and the right to be free of coercion against the state’s 
interest in solving crimes and securing convictions—purveyors of 
popular culture were busily instantiating and appropriating 
interrogation and confession for their own distinct purposes.  
Their product—the crime films and police shows that have served 
as a mainstay of pop culture since Hollywood’s birth—
simultaneously borrows from authoritative sources of law (such 
as Supreme Court opinions), mirrors popular assumptions about 
 
 22 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (citation omitted). 
 23 If law demanded voluntary confessions in the purest sense of the term, the only 
confessions the police could accept would be those in which a person of his own volition 
“enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime”—as Miranda itself 
almost but not quite suggested—the screenwriter (and the typical beat-cop) would be in 
difficult straits.  384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 354 
(1965)). 
 24 See BROOKS, supra note 7, at 35–42.  
 25 Nikolai Gogol, Diary of a Madman, in THE DIMENSIONS OF THE SHORT STORY: A 
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 53 (James E. Miller, Jr. & Bernice Slote eds., 1964). 
 26 See BILLY WILDER, DOUBLE INDEMNITY 10 (2000).  The movie Double Indemnity is 
discussed infra. 
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what law is, and shapes public attitudes toward what law should 
be.  Pop culture’s depiction of interrogation reflects and provides 
a record of evolving legal norms and changing public expectations 
not only about law and the legal process, but about the nature of 
the human condition.  The next part of this article attempts to 
illustrate this dynamic by juxtaposing images of interrogation in 
film and in Supreme Court decisions during the era of film noir.27 
I.  INTERROGATION IN THE PRE-MIRANDA ERA 
The contest between interrogator and suspect featured 
centrally in the film noir crime dramas of the 1940s and 1950s.28  
Indeed, many films noir used the interrogation/confession device 
as their basic narrative framework.29  In this part, I consider two 
brief fragments from a pair of the classic films noir, both released 
in 1944.  The first fragment is a bit of dialogue from Double 
Indemnity, a film which follows the ill-fated scheme of insurance 
salesman Walter Neff and housewife Phyllis Dietrichson to 
murder Dietrichson’s husband, which is told in the form of Neff’s 
dying confession.  Shortly after Neff (Fred MacMurray) has 
commenced an affair with Dietrichson (Barbara Stanwyck), 
Dietrichson divulges thoughts of murdering her rich and 
inattentive husband.  Neff, with a dawning realization that her 
interest in him is related to her desire to take out and collect on a 
secret insurance policy on her husband’s life, warns that such a 
plot would be quickly detected by his company’s claims 
investigator.  Says Neff, “[A] set-up like that would be just like a 
slice of rare roast beef.  In three minutes he’d know it wasn’t an 
accident.  In ten minutes you’d be sitting under the hot lights.  In 
half an hour you’d be signing your name to a confession.”30 
 
 27 The tactic used here is to focus more on fragmentary imagery, and less on the 
overarching moral lessons intended by the creators of popular culture, even if such 
overarching lessons could be clearly identified.  See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 1449–53 
(noting that film medium tends towards open-texturedness rather than closed, tight 
meanings in order to resonate with wider audiences, and thereby increase box-office 
appeal and profit). 
 28 Norman Rosenberg defines film noir as “a group of motion pictures released 
during the 1940s and 1950s that foreground images of ‘things legal.’”  See Rosenberg, 
supra note 15, at 1446. 
 29 Both Mildred Pierce (Warner Brothers 1945) and Double Indemnity (Paramount 
Pictures 1944) were told in the form of confessions given by their ill-fated protagonists.  
The Greatest Films, Mildred Pierce (1945), http://www.filmsite.org/mild.html; The 
Greatest Films, Double Indemnity (1944), http://www.filmsite.org/doub.html.  In Mildred 
Pierce, Mildred’s confession was made to the police in the course of police-station 
questioning.  In Double Indemnity, Walter Neff narrates his confession to a Dictaphone in 
his insurance office while he sits bleeding from a gunshot wound.  
 30 See Billy Wilder & Raymond Chandler, Double Indemnity (screenplay), available 
at http://www.weeklyscript.com/Double%20Indemnity.txt (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).  
The full dialogue is as follows: 
  PHYLLIS: The other night we drove home from a party.  He was drunk 
761-788 COVEY.DOC 9/18/2007 7:03:21 AM 
768 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:761 
The second fragment to consider is a climactic scene 
occurring near the end of another 1944 film, Laura.31  Laura 
Hunt (Gene Tierney) has been arrested for the murder of Diane 
Redfern, and Detective Mark McPherson (Dana Andrews) has 
brought Laura to the police station for questioning.  As soon as 
McPherson sits down, he flips on two bright interrogation lights 
directed in Laura’s face: 
McPherson 
  “All right, let’s have it.” 
Laura 
  “What are you trying to do, force a confession out of me?” 
McPherson 
  “You’ve been holding out and I want to know why.  It’ll be easier 
for you if you tell the truth.” 
Laura 
  “What difference does it make what I say.  You’ve made up your 
mind, I’m guilty.” 
McPherson 
  “Are you?” 
Laura 
  “Don’t tell me you have any doubts, since you. . . [dropping her 
head and shielding her eyes]  Oh, I can’t, please, do I have to have 
those lights in my face?” 
[McPherson turns off the lights.] 
  “Thanks.  [pause]  No, I didn’t kill Diane Redfern . . .”32 
 
What do these two filmic fragments tell us about the popular 
conception of interrogation?  Most obviously, their adoption of the 
“hot lights” in the interrogation room as a metaphor for police 
questioning suggests a prevalent assumption that moderate 
pressure in the interrogation room was standard, the norm 
rather than the exception.  In Laura, McPherson turns on the 
lights without hesitation or pause.  In Double Indemnity, when 
 
again.  When we got into the garage he just sat there with his head on the 
steering wheel and the motor still running. And I thought what it would be like 
if I didn’t switch it off, just closed the garage door and left him there. 
  NEFF: I’ll tell you what it would be like, if you had that accident policy, 
and tried to pull a monoxide job.  We have a guy in our office named Keyes.  
For him a set-up like that would be just like a slice of rare roast beef.  In three 
minutes he’d know it wasn’t an accident. In ten minutes you’d be sitting under 
the hot lights.  In half an hour you’d be signing your name to a confession. 
 31 LAURA (Twentieth Century Fox 1944). 
 32 Id. 
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Neff wishes to dissuade Phyllis from killing, he invokes the lights 
as a metaphor for police questioning.  The lights are synonymous 
with interrogation itself. 
In addition to reflecting a basic popular comfort with police 
pressure tactics in the interrogation room, several additional 
messages can be gleaned from the interrogation imagery in these 
pre-Miranda films.  First, Neff’s warning to Phyllis suggests a 
popular presupposition that when criminal suspicions point to a 
particular suspect, the suspect will be called to answer questions.  
Second, both fragments underscore the belief, or at least the 
pretense, that police pressure will induce revelation of the truth.  
These messages are of course fully consistent with the 
“dogmatic”33 moral lesson of the films of the period: crime 
(although titillating) doesn’t pay.  Criminality inevitably leads to 
confession, which in turn leads to retribution, either in the form 
of punishment or, more typically, death—the fate that befalls 
Dietrichson and Neff in Double Indemnity, and Waldo Lydecker, 
the real killer in Laura.  (Death, for narrative effect, is much 
neater than legal process.) 
If the “hot lights” metaphor demonstrates the popular 
expectation that suspects will be questioned and that police will 
apply pressure to get suspects to talk, the juxtaposition of strong 
pressure tactics and delicate (or apparently delicate) suspects 
such as Laura Hunt and Phyllis Dietrichson suggests a further 
expectation that police interrogational pressure will be 
moderated in proportion to the strength of the suspect’s capacity 
to withstand it.  After all, very little pressure is necessary to 
overcome Laura’s capacity—when she shows weakness, 
McPherson turns off the lights, and Laura talks.34 
As the words “film noir” suggest, the prevalence of darkness 
 
 33 Dogmatic, in the sense of reflecting the ordained beliefs authorized and approved 
by authority.  All films of this era were required to comply with the Production Code, 
which (among other things) dictated that “the sympathy of the audience should never be 
thrown to the side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin,” and that “[l]aw, natural or human, 
shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created for its violation.”  MOTION PICTURE 
PRODUCTION CODE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1, 3 (1930), reprinted in LEONARD J. LEFF & 
JEROLD L. SIMMONS, THE DAME IN THE KIMONO: HOLLYWOOD, CENSORSHIP, AND THE 
PRODUCTION CODE app., at 286–87 (2d ed. 2001). 
 34 Laura’s encounter further illustrates an image of police interrogation at once 
familiar and jarring: familiar because audiences are accustomed to the idea that criminals 
will be subjected to pressure tactics; jarring because McPherson’s treatment of the 
beautiful Laura as a typical criminal upsets our preconceived notions of who should be 
subjected to them.  The jarring quality of Laura’s interrogation does not represent a 
condemnation of police pressure tactics, however, nor is the propriety of interrogation 
room pressure diminished by the fact that Laura’s is an exculpatory confession. The 
confession is essential to the dissipation of the cloud of suspicion surrounding Laura and 
allows McPherson to identify the real killer and save Laura’s life. 
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to “convey a bleak or cynical mood”35 is an essential feature of the 
genre, and the play of light and dark not only serves an 
important aesthetic function but also works as an important 
narrative device.  In a literary sense, the “hot lights” symbolize 
the glare of inquisition, a glare that unearths the “subterranean 
life of guilty secrets.”36  Questioning under the hot lights 
represents the literal and figurative process by which guilty 
secrets and wicked motives are dredged from the recesses of the 
criminal mind and exposed to the light of moral judgment and, 
ultimately, legal retribution.  The harsh glare of the 
interrogation lights starkly contrasts with the shadowy 
underworlds in which the characters live.  An emerging 
fascination with Freud also was manifested in the interrogation 
moment, which did double duty as a metaphor for the struggle 
between the unconscious (which seeks to remain hidden) and the 
psychoanalytic impulse to expose it to light.37 
If police interrogation was portrayed as a useful, and 
perhaps essential, instrumentality of truth, interrogation was a 
soldier in the larger mission to expose the flawed humanity of the 
interrogated.  The classic film noir criminals—Walter Neff and 
Phyllis Dietrichson in Double Indemnity, or even Waldo Lydecker 
(Clifton Webb) in Laura—were not cardboard cutouts but 
complex, flawed human beings.  Part of film noir’s fascination 
stems from its willingness to trade in shades of gray, to explore 
the murky complexities of human motive that move men and 
women to do evil.  Criminality in film noir was variously 
portrayed as a vice or a weakness, stemming in some cases from 
the all-too-human desire for love, money, or drink, and in others, 
to moral or mental sickness, but almost always as the product of 
some recognizable human frailty.38  Film noir thus acknowledged 
the thin line separating ordinary men and women from 
criminals. 
How does law’s depiction of interrogation compare?  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the Supreme Court’s narrative tactics in its pre-
 
 35 TIMOTHY O. LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME 
STORIES 54 (2003). 
 36 BROOKS, supra note 7, at 116. 
 37 See LEFF & SIMMONS, supra note 33, at 131 (noting that many Hollywood 
scriptwriters, themselves undergoing psychoanalysis, increasingly incorporated Freudian 
themes into their film scripts in the 1940s).  As Brooks notes, like the interrogation room, 
the “Church’s carefully crafted confessional and the psychoanalyst’s couch are both places 
designed for the telling of intimate, dark secrets.”  BROOKS, supra note 7, at 141. 
 38 As such, the viewer has a complex emotional relationship with the main 
characters—empathizing with them at the same time that it becomes plain that they 
cannot escape retribution and punishment for their bad acts.  In this way, film noir 
constructs criminal justice as the unfolding of tragedy—the characters’ fatal flaws 
inevitably and inexorably causing their downfall. 
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Miranda involuntary confessions cases bear a striking 
resemblance to the interrogation-room dynamic depicted in film 
noir.  Walter Neff’s description of interrogation in Double 
Indemnity,39 for instance, echoes the interrogation of Major 
Raymond Lisenba described by the Court in Lisenba v. 
California,40 a case involving a defendant who—in classic film 
noir fashion—murdered his wife in order to collect life insurance 
on a “double indemnity” clause of the policy.  Rejecting Lisenba’s 
claim that his confession was involuntary, the Court explained 
that although Lisenba was confined and questioned without 
break by relays of police officers over a period of thirty-six hours, 
slapped (or worse), and deprived of sleep and food, the 
interrogation did not violate due process because, like the 
protypical film noir villain, Lisenba allegedly remained calm and 
cool throughout.  In the Court’s words, Lisenba 
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his 
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so 
lost his freedom of action that the statements were not his but were 
the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to 
refuse to answer.41   
The Court made no mention of interrogation lights in its opinion, 
but it registered no qualms over the pressure tactics that were 
admittedly used to interrogate Lisenba.  Like Double Indemnity 
and Laura, the Court implicitly assumed that some amount of 
police pressure was permitted and even expected. 
The “hot lights” were discussed at some length in Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, however, where the Court reversed a defendant’s 
murder conviction based on a finding that the defendant’s 
confession, elicited after thirty-eight hours of non-stop 
questioning, was involuntary.42  The Court narrated the events 
leading up to Ashcraft’s confession: 
[E]arly in the evening of Saturday, June 14, the officers came to 
Ashcraft’s home and ‘took him into custody.’  In the words of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, ‘They took him to an office or room on the 
northwest corner of the fifth floor of the Shelby County jail.  This 
office is equipped with all sorts of crime and detective devices such as 
a fingerprint outfit, cameras, high-powered lights, and such other 
devices as might be found in a homicide investigating office. . . . It 
 
 39 Double Indemnity was adapted from a novel by James M. Cain, which in turn was 
based on a real murder that made headlines in 1927.  The constant recycling of material 
from one genre to the next underscores the fluidity and seamlessness of the legal and 
cultural worlds.  See IMDb.com, Double Indemnity (1944), http://imdb.com/title/tt0036775/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2007). 
 40 314 U.S. 219, 223 (1941). 
 41 Id. at 241.   
 42 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).  
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appears that the officers placed Ashcraft at a table in this room on the 
fifth floor of the county jail with a light over his head and began to 
quiz him.  They questioned him in relays until the following Monday 
morning, June 16, 1941, around nine-thirty or ten o’clock.  It appears 
that Ashcraft from Saturday evening at seven o’clock until Monday 
morning at approximately nine-thirty never left this homicide room on 
the fifth floor.43 
Ashcraft’s interrogation followed the standard noir script in 
every detail.  The interrogation room, equipped with a variety of 
criminal detection devices and interrogation lights, could have 
been lifted directly from a Hollywood set.  As in Lisenba, police 
officers defended the extended interrogation with the assertion 
that after thirty-eight hours of questioning, Ashcraft remained 
“‘cool,’ ‘calm,’ ‘collected,’ ‘normal.’”44  But here the Court diverged 
from the script.  Ashcraft’s confession was not deemed, as it so 
easily might have been, the inevitable triumph of truth over 
criminal cunning.  Instead, the Court critically noted the 
documented evidence of systematic police misconduct in 
interrogation, including the use of the “hot lights” to induce 
confessions,45 and threw out Ashcraft’s conviction on grounds 
that the thirty-eight hour interrogation was “so inherently 
coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the 
possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom 
[the state’s] full coercive force is brought to bear.”46 
Ashcraft, decided in the same year that Double Indemnity 
and Laura were released, provided an alternative interrogation 
narrative, and one decidedly more liberal than pop culture’s. 
Certainly, the Court’s condemnation of high-pressure police 
questioning diverged from the hard-nosed assumptions about 
police questioning embedded in films like Double Indemnity and 
Laura.  
This is not to say that the Court was unanimous in its 
condemnation of the popular conception of police interrogation.  
Justice Jackson cited Lisenba in cautioning that he, at least, was 
“not ready to say that the pressure to disclose crime, involved in 
decent detention and lengthy examination,” even if “inherently 
coercive,” need be “denied to a State by the Constitution, where 
 
 43 Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
 44 Id. at 151. 
 45 The Wickersham Commission’s report on police third-degree practices had found 
that “[p]owerful lights turned full on the prisoner’s face, or switched on and off have been 
found effective” by police for inducing defendants to confess.  Id. at 150 n.6 (quoting 
Report of Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law made to the Section of Criminal Law 
and Criminology of the American Bar Association, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 575, 579–80 
(1930)). 
 46  Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 154 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 556, 562–
63 (1897)). 
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they are not proved to have passed the individual’s ability to 
resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.”47  Nonetheless, 
the Court’s basic direction appears to have been set.  Although, 
over the course of the following two decades, the Court grew 
increasingly skeptical of high-pressure police interrogation, the 
dominant paradigm continued to be that of the clash of wills 
between suspect and interrogator, where the question was 
whether the pressure exerted on the suspect was proportional to 
her mental, physical, and emotional resources.48  The use of belts, 
whips, and extended relay questioning was clearly improper, but 
the exploitation of inadequately explained inconsistencies fell 
safely within fair territory.  The suspect’s implicit obligation to 
produce an adequate and consistent explanation thus remained a 
central fact of police interrogation. 
Ultimately, consideration of interrogation imagery in film 
and law during this era gives rise to a complex picture.  On one 
hand, interrogation in the movies and in Supreme Court opinions 
share  basic preconceptions.  Interrogation in both mediums 
represented a climactic moment in the battle between good and 
evil, truth and crime, and pressure tactics—moderated so that 
the will of the suspect was not overborne—were recognized as a 
valuable tool to uncover wrongdoing.  Sometimes the police 
overreached, but sometimes substantial pressure was both 
necessary and appropriate to expose chinks in the “almost 
perfect” story.  At the same time, where Hollywood sought to 
emphasize the drama of the contest of wills, the Court began the 
project of crafting rules to limit the degree of pressure that 
interrogators might bring to bear on suspects.  The attack on the 
“hot lights” had begun.  To the extent that they lagged in 
reconceptualizing the interrogation-room narrative, it appears 
that Hollywood writers were taking their cues from the material 
around them, and not the other way around.49  Led by Justices 
 
 47 Id. at 170 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 48 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).  Justice Frankfurter 
explained that  
a confession made by a person in custody is not always the result of an 
overborne will. The police may be midwife to a declaration naturally born of 
remorse, or relief, or desperation, or calculation.  If that is so, if the ‘suction 
process’ has not been at the prisoner and drained his capacity for freedom of 
choice, does not the awful responsibility of the police for maintaining the 
peaceful order of society justify the means which they have employed? 
Id. at 576. 
 49 At least during this period, however, Hollywood’s picture of interrogation lagged 
behind the progressive efforts of the Court to bring due process principles to bear on 
confessions.  The 1944 films Laura and Double Indemnity are more akin in their 
iconography with the 1941 Lisenba case than they were with the 1944 Ashcraft decision 
which was already tending in the direction of Miranda.  Id. at 154 (Justice Black’s 
opinion, for example, suggests that interrogation standards should be judged by 
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Black and Frankfurter, the Court’s stepped-up assault on 
coercive interrogation tactics for the time being would put the 
Court further out in front of pop culture in the coming decades. 
II.  PERRY MASON, MIRANDA, AND INTERROGATION ON THE 
WITNESS STAND 
With Brown v. Board of Education50 on the horizon and an 
increasing interest in the expansion of civil rights, both law and 
culture were set for major changes at the mid-century.  By the 
time Miranda was decided, the effects of the civil rights 
movement and the ferment of the 1960s had wrought deep 
changes in popular culture, including a deep erosion in trust and 
sympathy for the police. 
This distrust was reflected in Hollywood’s choice of pop 
heroes.  Although popular in the 1950s, both the crime film and 
the cop show had almost disappeared in the early 1960s.51  To the 
extent police were portrayed at all in the popular culture of the 
decade, they tended to be depicted not as crime-fighting heroes 
but rather as “corrupt or inept.”52  Law, however, did not lose its 
attraction as a subject of pop culture.  Although the police drama 
may have lost its luster, the stock of lawyers rose to 
unprecedented heights.  The decade preceding Miranda 
witnessed a brief and unparalleled reign of the lawyer drama.53  
Three of the most famous trial films ever made, Anatomy of a 
Murder (1959), 12 Angry Men (1957), and To Kill a Mockingbird 
(1967)54 debuted during this period, as did the most famous trial 
lawyer never to grace an actual courtroom: Perry Mason.55 
 
comparison to the standards of the open courtroom: “It is inconceivable that any court of 
justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit 
prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-
examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a ‘voluntary’ 
confession.”). 
 50 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 54 (stating that “crime film noir lasted until around 
1955 when the public lost some of its interest in crime stories” in lieu of newfound interest 
in civil rights and the Cold War). 
 52 Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that there was “a brief period in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s in which police (along with other government officials) 
were often portrayed as corrupt or inept”). 
 53 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 54. 
 54 Id. at 46 (noting that these films continue to be “used in classrooms to teach civics 
lessons about law and politics”). 
 55 Mason made his television debut in 1957.  See Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets 
Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 229, 249 (1987).  One of the dominant themes of Perry Mason, and indeed many of 
the major television series of the 1960s, was the ineptness of the police who, week after 
week, managed to arrest the wrong suspect only so Mason could expose the mistake in 
court.  Other shows similarly “mocked the wayward ways of the crime-fighting 
establishment and even the law itself.”  Id. at 250.  At the same time, several shows in the 
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Just as the Supreme Court’s confession cases of the 1940s 
conceptualized interrogation in a manner paralleling the pop 
culture imagery of the era—as a battle of wits and wills between 
police officers and criminal suspects—Chief Justice Warren’s 
opinion in Miranda, like the Court’s opinions in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,56 Massiah v. United States,57 Escobedo v. Illinois,58 
and Duncan v. Louisiana,59 reflected an approach to 
constitutional criminal procedure that elevated the role of 
lawyers above that of the police.60  It is not farfetched to say, as 
some indeed have said, that the Warren Court’s major milestones 
were in some sense a product of Perry Mason, or at least a 
reflection of the assumptions about the roles of lawyers, law, 
courts, prosecutors, and police common to pop cultural depictions 
of the era.61 
In the Perry Mason view of the world, the defense lawyer 
rather than the police detective plays the principal role of 
guardian of justice.  Week after week on television, Perry Mason 
induced criminals to confess, not in the interrogation room under 
the hot lights, but instead in the open courtroom, in response to 
irrefutable evidence or withering cross-examination and with the 
whole community as witness.62  In the era of the lawyer drama, 
the law was certainly not depicted as perfect, as illustrated by 
the repeated false accusations of Mason’s clients or the unjust 
conviction of Tom Robinson in To Kill a Mockingbird.  But the 
solution to an imperfect law offered in the Perry Mason era was 
not the abandonment of law, but more and better law.63 
 
wake of Perry Mason’s success featured prosecutors as outright villains and defense 
lawyers as heroes.  Id. at 254 (discussing the television shows The Defenders, Cain’s 
Hundred, and Arrest and Trial).  Indeed, the period from 1960 to 1968 featured a 
remarkably small number of traditional crime and cops-and-robbers dramas. 
 56 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of 
counsel is a fundamental right incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause). 
 57 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 58 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 59 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is a fundamental 
right incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause). 
 60 See, e.g., Prime Time Law: Fictional Television as Legal Narrative, N.J. LAW., Oct. 
1998, at 34 (reviewing PRIME TIME LAW: FICTIONAL TELEVISION AS LEGAL NARRATIVE 
(Robert Jarvis & Paul Joseph eds., 1998) (noting that “Perry Mason’s success was . . . a 
function of what the public wanted to believe about its lawyers in that time”).  
 61 See Stark, supra note 55, at 230 (arguing that “it would be . . . foolish to pretend 
that [Perry Mason] played no role at all” in the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
decisions). 
 62 See id. at 249 (describing the “formulaic” structure of Perry Mason, in which every 
episode concluded with Mason putting on a string of witnesses that “forced the real 
culprit to confess in the courtroom”). 
 63 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 70 (noting that the message of To Kill a Mockingbird 
is “that law needs to be strengthened as an instrument of justice,” a message that is 
“consistent with the liberal model of justice”). 
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The need for more and better law is precisely what Miranda 
sought to deliver.  But if Miranda’s spin on interrogation was not 
truly original,64 its true genius, and perhaps what made it so 
controversial, was its wholesale inversion of the semiotics of 
interrogation.  Hollywood writers “worth their salt” have always 
known that credible drama demands congruence between plot 
and character, as have sophisticated judges and lawyers.  In 
Miranda, Warren sought to bolster the credence of the Court’s 
attempt to reshape interrogation law by presenting the story of 
interrogation from the perspective of the suspect rather than the 
police.  In this respect, he followed the teaching of Peter Fonda’s 
character in 12 Angry Men, in which Fonda explains that he does 
not share his fellow jurors’ initial inclination to convict the 
defendant because he “chose to see the case from the perspective 
of the defendant rather than the prosecution.”65  By narrating the 
process of interrogation by recounting the tricks described in 
police interrogation manuals, Miranda deftly inverted the 
traditional roles of criminal and cop.  By emphasizing the ploys 
used by interrogators to induce suspects to confess, Warren cast 
the police as the bad guys and suspects not as “criminals” but 
rather isolated, fearful, and helpless victims.66   
Not only did Miranda shift perspective on familiar character 
roles, it also inverted traditional metaphors of light and darkness 
in the criminal law iconography.  If in film noir the hot lights 
were a metaphor for the act of probing the dark recesses of the 
criminal mind—inevitably exposing the criminal’s secrets to 
view—in Miranda, interrogation itself became a kind of virtually 
“criminal” secret, and the interrogation room a place where 
“police violence and the ‘third degree’ flourished.”67  Occurring 
unrecorded, in private, and thus eluding our scope of 
 
 64 Miranda, of course, was not the first Supreme Court case to castigate police 
interrogation or to contrast it unfavorably with public, open-court proceedings.  Beginning 
with Justice Black’s decision in Ashcraft, the Court grew increasingly critical of high-
pressure police interrogation tactics that diverged from courtroom standards.  Justice 
Frankfurter, for instance, wrote in Watts v. Indiana that “[t]o turn the detention of an 
accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be extorted in 
open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to offend 
the procedural standards of due process.”  338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). 
 65 LENZ, supra note 35, at 64. 
 66 George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: 
“Embedded” In Our National Culture?, in 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 217 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2002) (“Somehow, suspects gained a measure of the Court’s sympathy between Lisenba 
and Miranda.  Somehow, the police had become authoritarian rather than simply 
overzealous.”); Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1447, 1472 
(1985) (noting that although previous Supreme Court cases viewed the arrestee “as a 
hardy suspect—unwilling to confess and able to resist police questioning for hours 
without having his will overborne,” Miranda portrayed arrestees as easily manipulatable 
persons). 
 67 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
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understanding, the interrogation room became the procedural 
equivalent of the Freudian unconscious—calling forth for a 
different sort of confession.68  Miranda’s solution was to expose 
interrogation’s own dark secrets to public scrutiny, and in so 
doing to “interrogate” interrogation itself.69 
Ultimately, this narrative move may not have been possible 
without the cover provided by the pop culture tropes of the 
period.  The interplay between the Supreme Court’s interrogation 
jurisprudence and popular culture’s changing depiction of the 
role of lawyers, police and suspects is hard to pin down.  It may 
be, however, that just as the creators of Perry Mason needed 
Justices Black and Frankfurter to lay the groundwork that would 
make Mason a compelling character,  Chief Justice Warren 
needed Perry Mason to establish the cultural preconditions 
necessary for the large-scale transformation of legal culture he so 
obviously envisioned. 
In any event, Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in 
Miranda, which offered as a rejoinder to Warren’s narrative the 
assertion that “peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark 
moments of the law,”70 suggests that Warren’s semiotic inversion 
did not pass wholly unnoticed.  As the dissenters pointed out, the 
majority opinion reflected not merely a concern with the 
circumstances in which some confessions are made, but rather “a 
deep-seated distrust of all confessions.”71  To those who accepted 
the film noir image of interrogation as a necessary process of 
subjecting the suspect to questioning under the “hot lights,” as 
did Justice Harlan, Miranda was a wolf in sheep’s clothing.72  It 
threatened inevitably to “return a killer, a rapist or other 
criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced 
 
 68 Id. at 445.  Chief Justice Warren imagines what happens during interrogation by 
recounting the interrogation tactics detailed in training manuals. 
 69 At least in a literary sense, the Miranda warnings perform an illuminative 
function very different from the interrogation room lights in the classic films noir.  Not 
only do they educate suspects about their rights, but they also highlight, emphasize, and 
focus suspects on those rights.  Repetition of the warnings makes it plain to the suspect 
that the decision to speak or remain silent is a choice with serious consequences.  
Miranda further illuminated the interrogation room chamber by opening its door to 
defense counsel.  Knowledge of rights and the presence of counsel, the majority clearly 
hoped, would allow a fearful defendant to confront his interrogators with the assistance of 
law and thereby “to tell his story without fear.”  Id. at 466.  Either by teaching suspects 
their rights, by opening up the interrogation room to the watchful eye of counsel, or by 
shifting the locus of the defendant’s questioning from the interrogation room to the 
courtroom, Miranda was intended to dissipate the darkness surrounding the 
interrogation process, permitting truth to prevail in the courtroom—not in the backroom. 
 70 Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 71 Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting). 
 72 Like Justice Jackson before him, Justice Harlan accepted that some pressure in 
the police interrogation room was essential to the revelation of truth.  See id. at 515 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”73  It also posed 
a veiled threat to every Hollywood screenwriter who needed to 
find a realistic way to allow his or her characters to confess in 
accord with the rules of dramatic narrative.  
III.  DRAGNET AND MIRANDA’S POPULAR DISSEMINATION 
It did not take long for Miranda to travel from slip opinion to 
television script.  Less than a year after the decision was handed 
down, the Miranda warnings became a regular component of 
Sergeant Joe Friday’s arrest spiel on the television cop show, 
Dragnet.  Dragnet, the brainchild of its star and creator Jack 
Webb, dramatized the day-to-day police work of the Los Angeles 
Police Department (“LAPD”).  The show, which first aired on 
radio and then ran on television from 1952–1957, and was 
revived in 1967 for a second run through 1970, purported to 
dramatize real cases drawn from the files of the LAPD.  Because 
of Webb’s insistence on realism—real LAPD detectives served as 
technical advisers to the show74—the new Miranda rules were 
duly incorporated into the stories. 
Given Dragnet’s tremendous popularity, the Miranda 
warnings quickly entered the American consciousness, but to 
what end?  Friday’s matter-of-fact delivery of the Miranda 
warnings undoubtedly suggested that law enforcement officers 
were cognizant of their legal duties and scrupulously respectful 
of civil rights.  Detached, taciturn, devoted to his job and little 
else, Friday presented a calm and reassuring portrait of 
American law enforcement—an image likely to be comforting to 
the public and to television sponsors hoping for an antidote to the 
sense of a growing crime threat and perceptions of increasing 
disorder on the streets in the late 1960s.75  Miranda’s apparently 
easy incorporation into the arrest and police questioning rituals 
might also have given Dragnet viewers the impression that 
respecting civil rights in general, and Miranda in particular, was 
not a difficult ordeal for the police.  In addition, and perhaps 
most importantly, Dragnet’s treatment of Miranda suggested 
that the new procedures were in any event largely symbolic.  On 
any typical episode, the arrest proceeded as follows: First, Friday 
or his partner would recite the Miranda warnings.  Second, as 
soon as the warnings were given, Friday or his partner would 
launch into questioning.  Third, in response, suspects 
 
 73 Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
 74 LENZ, supra note 35, at 86. 
 75 See Stark, supra note 55, at 246 (“In broadcasting, . . . there is a key intermediary, 
the sponsor, who controls all air time, either directly or indirectly. Dragnet’s portrayal of 
the police undoubtedly warmed the hearts of advertisers, who found a pro-establishment 
sentiment more in keeping with their conservative political views.”). 
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volunteered (often incriminating) answers.76  On Dragnet, 
recitation of the warnings did nothing to change the essential 
nature of the custodial encounter.   
In retrospect, Hollywood’s decision to cast Miranda in this 
symbolic and ineffectual manner is not surprising; the dramatic 
demand for confession was as great after Miranda as it had been 
before.  An interesting question, however, is whether Joe Friday’s 
taciturn treatment of Miranda had any effect in actual 
interrogation rooms.  Given that Miranda itself has had little, if 
any, effect on the confession rate, perhaps Joe Friday did teach a 
lesson to police and their suspects.77  Several studies of police 
interrogation after Miranda have documented that police 
typically deliver Miranda in essentially the same droning 
monotone as Joe Friday, a tactic calculated to minimize the 
perception that the stakes have increased.  What happens in real 
life is thus essentially what happened on Dragnet: the warnings 
are read, and the suspect talks.78   
Dragnet, of course, depicted the criminal justice system from 
the perspective of law enforcement officers.  As such, it 
demanded that viewers empathize with cops, not criminals.  
Nonetheless, the relatively peaceful, matter-of-fact, just-the-
facts-ma’am policing style shown on Dragnet drew from and 
suggested a system that was fundamentally at peace with the 
law.  On Dragnet, the police were competent and disinterested, 
they caught the bad guys, and they played “by the book.”  
Consistent with the values of Perry Mason and the lawyer 
dramas of the earlier part of the decade, Dragnet presented “a 
formal, idealistic, civics conception of the criminal justice system.  
The police and judges are still on the same side,” and “law, order, 
and justice are still closely related.”79 
 
 76 See, for example, Dragnet: The Kidnapping (NBC television broadcast Jan. 26, 
1967) (or virtually any episode, where suspects make incriminating statements 
immediately after receiving the warnings). 
 77 See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of Miranda: Why We Needed It, 
How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944546#PaperDownload, 
at 23 (observing that “[w]ith one conspicuous exception, there is wide agreement that 
Miranda has had a negligible impact on the confession rate”). 
 78 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 237 (noting that empirical studies indicate 
that “despite the fourfold warnings, suspects frequently waived their Miranda rights and 
chose to speak to their interrogators.  Some researchers attributed this largely 
unexpected finding to the manner in which detectives delivered the Miranda warnings, 
while others attributed it to the failure of suspects to understand the meaning or 
significance of their Miranda rights”). 
 79 LENZ, supra note 35, at 89. 
761-788 COVEY.DOC 9/18/2007 7:03:21 AM 
780 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 10:761 
IV.  THE POST-MIRANDA ERA 
Joe Friday’s stoic acceptance of Miranda, however, hardly 
reflected the storm of controversy that surrounded Miranda in 
the “real world.”  In Congress and in police departments across 
the nation, Miranda was greeted with outrage and hostility.80  
Although that hostility was not reflected on Dragnet, during the 
1970s, television crime fighters grew increasingly jaded and 
dismissive both of Miranda and of the need more generally to 
protect the civil rights of criminal suspects.81  Indeed, Jack 
Webb’s sequel to the Dragnet series—Adam-12 (which ran from 
1968–1975)—regularly featured uniformed LAPD officers 
complaining about the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
decisions.82  By the time Kojak debuted in 1976, the dominant 
attitude of cops toward law had undergone a total transformation 
from the Perry Mason/Dragnet era. 
Kojak, played by bald-is-beautiful Telly Savalas, was a hard-
nosed, “blue-collar, ethnic cop” who “was tougher than his 
predecessors, as well as more violent, unyielding, and obsessed 
with the way criminals were ‘getting off’ because the police were 
not allowed to do their job properly.”83  In stark contrast to 
Detective Friday’s stoic and dutiful delivery of the Miranda 
warnings to arrestees, Kojak glibly announced to his captives in 
a first-season episode: “You guys all know your rights, you don’t 
have to say anything.”84  In another episode, a suspect 
interrupted his interrogation by asserting that he would like a 
lawyer, and Kojak retorted, “Doesn’t everybody?”  The 
interrogation continued without a lawyer.85 As Kojak 
demonstrates, by 1976, television cop shows had taken a turn 
away from the bland, just-the-facts-ma’am style of Dragnet and 
 
 80 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 205 (noting that “[t]he political reaction was 
swift and clear,” including passage of legislation in 1968 purporting to repeal the 
decision); id. at 214 (“The instrumental fear was that warning suspects of a ‘right to 
remain silent’ and then promising a free lawyer to stand between them and the police 
would cause the rate of successful interrogations to plummet and the crime rate to soar.”). 
 81 Buoyed in part by the popular success of Dragnet and the networks’ insatiable 
appetite for popular programming, the era of the television police drama dawned with a 
vengeance.  During the next several years, the networks debuted a number of new police 
shows, including popular hits such as The Mod Squad (ABC television broadcast 1968–
73), Adam-12 (NBC television broadcast 1968–75), and Hawaii-Five-0 (CBS television 
broadcast 1968–80), and countless more detective shows, from Columbo (NBC television 
broadcast 1968) to Baretta (ABC television broadcast 1975–78). 
 82 See LENZ, supra note 35, at 87. 
 83 Stark, supra note 55, at 262–63. 
 84 Kojak: Knockover (CBS television broadcast Nov. 14, 1973).  Following this 
truncated Miranda warning, Kojak grabs two suspects for an arrest photo and asks them 
to “say cheese.” 
 85 Stark, supra note 55, at 264. 
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stopped doing things “by the book.”86  Not only did Hollywood cool 
to Dragnet’s (and Miranda’s) sense of procedural regularity, 
Hollywood affirmatively embraced the perspective of the 
dissenters in Miranda who predicted not only that Miranda 
would return rapists and killers to the streets, but that it would 
harm “those who rely on the public authority for protection and 
who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns, 
knives and the help of their neighbors similarly inclined.”87   
Dirty Harry was the first of several major Hollywood films to 
dramatize that prediction.88  In Dirty Harry, Clint Eastwood 
starred as Detective Harry Callahan, a rogue cop with blatant 
disdain for the law but a “good heart.”  Merciless to the bad guys, 
Dirty Harry is precisely the kind of cop you want on your side 
when the going gets tough.  Rich in a symbolism of political and 
cultural criticism, the set-up of the movie involves the San 
Francisco police department’s failing efforts to catch a serial 
killer loose on the streets of San Francisco.  The killer has 
kidnapped a young girl and has demanded ransom.  The Mayor, 
somewhat like Neville Chamberlain in 1939, agrees to appease 
the killer and pay the ransom.  Although Detective Callahan is 
scornful, he consents to deliver the ransom money (although 
obviously he has no intention of obeying orders).  After a vicious 
battle that almost costs Callahan his life, Dirty Harry tracks 
down and corners the killer in an empty football stadium.  
Displaying no mercy, Callahan coldly shoots the fleeing killer in 
the leg, and in a haunting and violent scene, demands to know 
where the kidnapped girl is.  When the killer fails to reply, 
Callahan grinds his heel into the killer’s mangled limb, 
provoking a desperate cry: “I want a lawyer . . . I have a right to 
a lawyer . . . I have rights . . . .”  The scene fades to black while 
the wounded killer howls like an animal in pain. 
The film immediately cuts to Detective Callahan watching 
the girl’s dead body being retrieved from a hole, confirming that 
his act of torture succeeded in inducing the killer to confess.  
Then, in the next scene, Callahan has been called into his boss’s 
office and arrives expecting congratulations.  Instead, he is 
berated for his use of unlawful methods, informed that his search 
violated the suspect’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment rights, 
 
 86 Id. (“On television, the police of the 1970’s [sic] grew increasingly more 
contemptuous of the Constitution.”). 
 87 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 88 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. 1971).  See also Charles Bronson in Death Wish 
(Paramount Pictures 1974), described as a “key film in the vigilante cycle,” and a 
mutation of “cop movies like Dirty Harry into an uncomfortable lynch mob attitude.”  THE 
BFI COMPANION TO CRIME (Phil Hardy ed., 1997). 
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and told that the evidence is inadmissible in court and that the 
killer would go free.89 
The interrogation scene in Dirty Harry contrasts vividly, to 
say the least, with those in Laura and Dragnet.  Not only does 
the film openly accuse the law of coddling vicious criminals to the 
detriment of public safety, but it seems to challenge the very 
premise of police regulation of interrogation.  Dirty Harry’s 
political message is hardly subtle: the law is the problem, not the 
solution, because it creates a wedge between the forces of justice 
that need information and the criminals who seeks to conceal it.90  
And what is the law?  What are the rights that let serial killers 
get off the hook for their crimes?  Largely, the film suggests, 
Miranda, and particularly its promised right to counsel.  Dirty 
Harry makes Miranda an icon of all that is perverse and 
ineffective in the justice system.  Dirty Harry’s torture of the 
suspect, though portrayed with brutality, is ultimately meant to 
seem justifiable as a matter of simple justice, even if not legal in 
the eyes of the lawyers.  In this manner, Dirty Harry not only 
takes on Miranda, it harkens all the way back to Brown v. 
Mississippi.91  If law undermines the ability of cops to get 
confessions from clearly guilty suspects, does it not also 
undermine the possibility of justice? 
Like Dragnet, the cop shows of the 1970s told their stories 
from the point of view of the police.  As the cop shows became 
more sophisticated, the characters of the police men and women 
they featured gradually grew increasingly textured.  But the 
criminals of this era, unlike their film noir predecessors, 
remained simple caricatures: animals so lost in their lust to do 
evil that it rarely mattered what fate befell them—arrest, 
shooting, or death by car crash—as long as they were ultimately 
tamed and subdued.92  In Dirty Harry’s climactic interrogation 
 
 89 In the end, Callahan disobeys a direct order to stay away from the case, saves a 
busload of children abducted by the killer, and delivers proper retribution.  See 
IMDb.com, Plot Summary for Dirty Harry (1971), http://imdb.com/title/tt0066999/ 
plotsummary (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). 
 90 See William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of 
Revenge, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE, supra note 8, at 161, 174 (noting that films 
like Dirty Harry and Death Wish depict Miranda warnings and other legal rules as 
symbols of the state’s failure to deliver real justice; that is, they depict the loss of faith in 
public institutions). 
 91 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936) (holding that a confession procured through torture 
violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and further, that this 
applies to the states). 
 92 The villain in Dirty Harry was as extreme an example of this as possible, a 
“psycho hippie” who “rapes and buries alive a teenager, shoots innocent people at random, 
tries to blackmail the whole city and finally terrorises [sic] a busload of children.”  THE 
BFI COMPANION TO CRIME, supra note 88, at 108.  This phenomenon might be explained 
in part by an increasing emphasis on the portrayal of cops in contrast to film noir’s focus 
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scene, Detective Callahan does not question a person, he breaks 
an animal. 
Released in 1971, Dirty Harry anticipated the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts’ campaign to scale back Miranda.  Numerous 
factors undoubtedly contributed to the backlash against 
Miranda.  Most obviously, conservative judicial appointments 
from the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations replaced 
liberals who were sympathetic to the Warren Court’s progressive 
goals.  But it is likely that pop culture’s attack on law’s benign 
image, an attack that necessarily undermined the Court’s own 
legitimacy, further encouraged the Court’s retreat.  After all, the 
Justices, lacking both purse and sword, “must rely on public 
support for the implementation of their policies.”93  Here, it is 
Hollywood that is clearing space for a post-Warren Court 
retrenchment by reshaping the iconography, not only of 
interrogation, but of law itself.  In any event, with only a few 
exceptions,94 what followed Dirty Harry was a barrage of 
decisions that whittled down the scope and effect of Miranda 
and, at the same time, the costs to police of using pressure tactics 
to induce confessions.  The first, and perhaps the most important, 
of these decisions was handed down the same year Dirty Harry 
was released.  In Harris v. New York, the Court held that 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda could be used for 
impeachment purposes.95  Harris undercut the hope that 
Miranda would provide the foundation for an interrogation-room 
code of conduct, and gave police ample incentive to ignore 
Miranda when doing so proved convenient.  It also set the tone 
for the decisions to follow.  Three years later, Michigan v. Tucker 
introduced the theory of Miranda as a “prophylactic” rule.96  In 
1979, North Carolina v. Butler established the critical 
clarification (really, partial overruling) of Miranda’s waiver 
rules, relieving police of the supposed heavy burden of showing 
that a suspect expressly waived his Miranda rights, so long as 
the facts and circumstances show that an implicit waiver was 
 
on criminals.  But even prominent films that did give villains a high profile, such as THE 
SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures Corporation 1991), tended to depict the villains as 
grotesqueries, not as normal human beings gone astray.  See  IMDb.com, Plot Summary 
for Silence of the Lambs (1991), http://imdb.com/title/tt0102926/plotsummary (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2007). 
 93 VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 5 (2003). 
 94 See, for example, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), which illustrated 
almost precisely the specter that Dirty Harry dramatized. 
 95 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
 96 417 U.S. 433, 445–46 (1974) (“[T]he police conduct at issue here did not abridge 
respondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but departed 
only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to 
safeguard that privilege.”). 
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knowing and intelligent.97  Numerous decisions in the 1980s and 
1990s only further watered down Miranda’s substantive 
protections.98 
By the time Dickerson came before the Court, Miranda had 
been broken—much like Dirty Harry’s serial killer.  As the Court 
somewhat euphemistically stated, “[O]ur subsequent cases have 
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law 
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling . . . .”99  
The notion that Miranda would make obsolete the backroom 
interrogation, that confessions would be made in the courtroom, 
if at all, or for that matter, that suspects needed much legal 
protection from their interrogators was long gone.100  Miranda as 
legal formalism, however, was more entrenched than ever both in 
popular culture and in legal practice.  Police departments had 
grown accustomed to Miranda, and even began to see its 
charm.101  While Miranda—especially in its watered down post-
Dirty Harry incarnation—placed few real constraints on police 
interrogation, it shielded interrogation practices from 
substantive scrutiny.102  As long as Miranda’s formal warnings 
and waiver requirements were met, any confession obtained 
thereafter was almost always been treated as voluntary.103 
 
 97 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
 98 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1975) (expanding Harris v. New York’s  
exception to permit the use of statements obtained after police disregarded the 
defendant’s request for counsel for impeachment purposes); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 
231, 240–41 (1980) (permitting the use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes); 
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (permitting the use of post-arrest silence for 
impeachment purposes); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (holding that 
Miranda warnings are not required prior to roadside questioning during a routine traffic 
stop); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a “public-safety exception” to 
Miranda); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations), Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 
(1986) (holding that a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary 
despite failure of the police to inform him that a lawyer was attempting to contact him 
during interrogation); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding that the police are 
not obliged to inform suspect of specific crimes that are subject of interrogation); Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that an undercover police officer is not required to 
administer warnings to a suspect interrogated in a jail cell); and Davis v. United States, 
512 U.S. 452 (1994) (holding that ambiguous invocations of Miranda rights may be 
ignored).   
 99 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). 
 100 See Kamisar, supra note 77, at 25 (“[T]he Miranda that had survived the Burger 
Court-Rehnquist Court gauntlet . . . was a far cry from what might be called the ‘original 
Miranda.’”). 
 101 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 66, at 252–53 (noting that “for the most part law 
enforcement supports Miranda” and pointing out that “none of the major police lobbying 
groups . . . joined in then[-]Attorney General Edwin Meese’s call to overrule Miranda” in 
the mid-1980s). 
 102 Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2001). 
 103 Id. 
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Perhaps because the post-Miranda crime shows have focused 
so heavily on cops, the dramatic function of confession has 
assumed an ever more instrumental quality, at least on the cop 
shows.  Confession undoubtedly did little for the killer’s soul in 
Dirty Harry, but it did permit police to find the abducted victim.  
This instrumentalism might be seen as a reflection of deeper 
societal attitudes toward criminals over the course of a three-
decade period that saw the incarceration rate quadruple since 
Dirty Harry was released. 
By the 1990s, Miranda’s iconization was complete.  The 
Miranda warnings indeed had become “embedded” in popular 
culture.  Today, a whole complex of narrative events signifying a 
character’s arrest can be concisely depicted by a writer merely 
with the image of a police officer taking physical custody of a 
suspect and intoning: “You have the right to remain silent . . . .”  
At the same time, a new brand of television cop shows such as 
Homicide and, in particular, NYPD Blue, have constructed their 
basic narrative formulas around the suspect’s interrogation.  As 
such, the suspect’s decision to forgo his or her right to counsel 
and to talk to police has taken a central place in the storyline.104  
For better or worse, the reading of Miranda warnings is no 
longer the mere formalism it was on Dragnet.  Indeed, because 
the narrative in these shows is driven by the unfolding 
interrogation, and the dramatic catharsis almost invariably 
arrives in the form of the suspect’s confession, the Miranda 
rights serve, alongside the suspect’s own mental and 
psychological prowess, as the foil that creates the story’s 
dramatic tension. 
Thus over the course of nearly 70 years, the imagery of 
interrogation seems to have traveled a circle in four curvilinear 
steps.  In the pre-Miranda period of the 1930s and 1940s, police 
use of interrogation room pressure was normal and expected.  
The 1950s and 1960s witnessed an accelerating rejection of 
pressure tactics by the Supreme Court and an era of popular 
culture which increasingly, albeit briefly, held up lawyers as 
heroes and law as a force of both truth (Perry Mason) and order 
(Dragnet).  These developments laid the foundation for the classic 
“Miranda era,” which was characterized by a popular, albeit 
temporary, inversion of the traditional demonization of the 
criminal and glorification of the cop, a corresponding celebration 
of formal law and of criminal defense lawyers in particular, and 
which saw the mass public dissemination of the warnings on 
 
 104 See Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 8 (1998) (noting that “[t]he unifying 
principle in [NYPD Blue] interrogations is the need to convince suspects not to consult a 
lawyer”). 
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shows like Dragnet and Adam-12.  Beginning with President 
Nixon’s election in 1968, however, the Miranda era gave way to a 
post-Miranda period characterized by an increasing backlash 
against the Warren Court agenda.  In the post-Miranda world, 
Miranda was targeted by critics and reactionaries and became an 
icon of the law’s perceived tenderness toward criminals.  And at 
the same time that Miranda became an object of derision in the 
crime dramas of the 1970s and 1980s, it was slowly but steadily 
gutted by the Supreme Court in a long series of decisions that 
sought to make compliance with the Miranda rules simple and to 
minimize the consequences of noncompliance. 
By 1999, Miranda had been neutered as an instrument of 
progressive legal regulation even while it had become the symbol 
of constitutional rights in the popular imagination.  Viewed from 
this vantage point, the Court’s decision in Dickerson was a fait 
accompli. Having cut Miranda down to manageable size, a 
conservative Court had nothing left to gain by formally 
overruling Miranda.  But it stood to lose an inestimable amount 
of popular esteem should it purport to withdraw from the 
citizenry the most familiar set of legal rights known to them.  It 
perhaps even risked losing “the Nation’s confidence in the judge 
as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”105 
Meanwhile, contemporary cop shows have subtly altered 
Miranda by making it part and parcel of the drama of 
interrogation.  If Miranda is no longer vilified as the enemy of 
the beat cop, neither is it his friend.106 Still, it remains as 
ineffective a safeguard for preventing confessions as ever.  In 
retrospect, this process, too, seems to have been inevitable.  
Miranda’s purpose—the regulation of custodial interrogation—
strikes such a sensitive narrative nerve that its neutralization 
was a dramatic imperative.  To comply with the demands of 
verisimilitude, screenwriters had no choice but to incorporate 
Miranda into the dramatic representation of the interrogation 
moment.  At the same time, the overarching narrative demands 
of the format continued to require confessions.  As a result, 
although Miranda has been widely publicized in pop culture, it 
has been portrayed in a manner that underscores its impotence; 
in popular culture, Miranda warnings or no, the suspect always 
confesses. 
Finally, although Miranda’s post-Dragnet decline can be 
understood partly as the work of an increasingly conservative 
 
 105 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106 See Bandes & Beermann, supra note 13, at 7 (noting the willingness of NYPD Blue 
characters to ignore the Constitution when it is necessary to get the bad guys). 
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Court, a response to a continuing explosion in the crime rate, and 
a pervasive cultural cynicism fueled by Vietnam and Watergate, 
it also must be understood in part as an almost inevitable 
aesthetic development.  After all, films and television shows are 
first and foremost entertainment vehicles; their function is to 
titillate and amuse, all with the intent of maximizing viewership 
from the right demographic and, a fortiori, network and studio 
revenue.  Given the aesthetic demands of popular drama, 
Dragnet-style rectitude inevitably had to give way to something 
more interesting.  As one writer in the 1970s complained, “Our 
whole show has to come to a dead stop every week while the cop 
politely reads the crook his rights.”107  And as another added, 
“This civil rights business may be all right in real life but it 
makes miserable drama.”108 
CONCLUSION 
The Dirty Harry-style paranoia eventually faded, but it left 
in its wake a pop culture version of Miranda in which the 
warnings have become an icon representing the whole awkward 
apparatus of courts, law, and constitutional regulation of 
criminal justice.  To many, these rights undoubtedly “stand for” 
the very idea of constitutional law. 
Because the Miranda warnings—routine or reviled—have 
become synonymous with constitutional law—and thus with the 
Supreme Court itself—it is no surprise that the Court declined to 
eradicate them in Dickerson.  Doing so would have amounted to 
eradication of law itself in the eyes of popular culture.  The 
Court’s institutional interest in preserving its own popular 
status, and in protecting a legal regime that, thanks to the 
media, looks like it bends over backward for defendants, while in 
reality (as a result of a sustained judicial attack on its 
fundamental functions) provides defendants very little legal 
protection, allows a conservative Court to have its cake and eat 
it, too. 
In sum, just as the media necessarily creates and depends 
upon signs, symbols, and icons, and manipulates them to serve 
its basic purposes—to tell its stories effectively and efficiently, to 
keep viewers engaged, and to keep sponsors happy—in narrating 
and explicating legal decisions, courts do precisely the same 
 
 107 Stark, supra note 55, at 261 (quoting Gunther, TV Police Dramas are Teaching 
Civil Rights to a Generation of Viewers, TV GUIDE, Dec. 18, 1971, at 9).  Perhaps the 
underlying sentiment of Dickerson is just the opposite, that this civil rights business may 
make good drama, but it is pretty miserable in real life. 
 108 Id. (quoting Gunther, TV Police Dramas are Teaching Civil Rights to a Generation 
of Viewers, TV GUIDE, Dec. 18, 1971, at 9). 
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thing, with their own institutional interests dictating the manner 
in which those signs will be treated.  Certainly, the semiotics of 
interrogation, followed over time, elucidates important changes 
in popular and legal assumptions about a variety of aspects of 
criminal justice, including the identity of criminals, the causes of 
criminality, the purposes of interrogation, and the proper role of 
interrogators.  The fact that popular and legal iconography has 
moved along the same trajectory suggests not only that popular 
culture draws its source material from the courts, but also that 
the courts narrate, and perhaps resolve, legal problems based in 
no small part on iconographic assumptions drawn from popular 
culture and the media as well. 
 
